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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Whitehorn v. State:
PEYOTE AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN OKLAHOMA
Robert Johnston
The case of Whitehorn v. State,1 a recent decision by the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, through the Honorable
Judge C. F. Bliss, Jr., is one of the leading cases, to date, concern-
ing the use of peyote as a sacrament for members of the Native
American Church. In holding that "use [carrying on the person] of
peyote by the Native American Church members is an intricate
part of their constitutionally protected religious beliefs and
therefore should be protected from governmental interference,
'2
the court has extended the protection of the first amendment not
only to use of peyote in a religious ceremony,3 but also to "the
practice of 'carrying' peyote by members of the Native American
Church .... " Thus, the Oklahoma court has "legally recognized"
the freedom of Native American Church members to pursue their
religious beliefs. In discussing the significance of Whitehorn, cases
from jurisdictions other than Oklahoma must be considered,
because Whitehorn was a case of first impression.
Statement of the Case
George L. Whitehorn, Otoe-Ponca, was enroute from his home
in Red Rock, Oklahoma, to see his father in an Enid nursing home'
when he was stopped by two uniformed police officers. At that
time he was charged with operating a defective motor vehicle,
operating a motor vehicle with an expired safety inspection
sticker, and driving while his driver's license was under
suspension.' After being taken into custody, Whitehorn was
transported to the county jail in Enid, at which time his personal
possessions were confiscated and inventoried. Among those items
confiscated was a handkerchief containing what appeared to be
peyote and also a necklace which seemed to be made of the same
material. Whitehorn admitted to the officers that the material was
peyote.'
At trial, the vehicle-related offenses were dropped and
Whitehorn was charged with possession of a controlled dangerous
substance, peyote, in violation of the Uniform Controlled
Dangerous Substances Act of the state of Oklahoma.9 In submit-
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ting evidence for the state, the prosecution called only three
witnesses. Both arresting officers testified to the aforementioned
facts. A forensic chemist for the Oklahoma State Bureau of In-
vestigation testified that the substance confiscated from
Whitehorn was peyote and that, "mescaline would be in peyote
and... it can be derived from it, but it's two different
substances."" Following this testimony, the state rested its case.
Evidence for the defendant explained the customs, history, and
use of peyote in the Native American Church. The defendant also
asserted that he was a good faith practitioner and member of the
Otoe and Ponca local chapters of the Native American Church.
This assertion was corroborated by several witnesses.'" After trial
to the court, a verdict of guilty was handed down against the
defendant. The judgment and sentence imposed was for a term of
two years' imprisonment with the sentence being suspended."
On appeal, defendant first asserted that possession of peyote is
not a crime in Oklahoma because peyote is not specifically listed
in Schedule I of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances
Act." The court, citing two cases from foreign jurisdictions,'5 held
"peyote is a material which contains a quantity of mescaline and
therefore its possession is prohibited by the Oklahoma Act."' 6 In
spite of the legislative history in Oklahoma concerning the use and
possession of peyote, the court determined that peyote was in-
cluded in the Act "by implication."
The defendant next urged that the state failed to demonstrate
that the quantity of peyote found on his person was sufficient to
cause hallucinogenic effects, thereby rendering its possession
legal. In support of this argument, the defendant cited State v.
.Moreno," which held that the burden is on the prosecution to
demonstrate that the quantity of the drug possessed was sufficient
t:o cause such hallucinogenic effects. More precisely, "the State
must prove possession of a usable quantity."'9 The court rejected
this argument, citing Doyle v. State," in which the court con-
strued the concept of "usable quantity." In that case, the court
noted: "Clearly by the statutory language stating 'which contains
any quantity of the following substances' the legislature classified
amphetamine as a controlled dangerous substance in any
quantity."2'
Relying on the aforementioned authorities, the court held in
Whitehorn that "Section 2-204C does not require the State to
prove that the quantity of the substance possessed by an accused
was sufficient to cause hallucinogenic effects."'
Finally, the defendant urged that "even if possession of peyote is
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considered a criminal offense the defendant is protected by the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution, right to
religious freedom, and is granted an exception to the possession
law." The state, in reply, argued that the legislative prohibition
of the possession of peyote, in spite of the effects it may have on
bona fide members of the Native American Church, is a valid ex-
ercise of the state police powers. The state, citing several Amish,
Morman, and Jehovah Witness cases,24 argued that the general rule
is that the free exercise of religion does not include the right to
commit crimes in the name of religion.s
In ruling on this issue, the Oklahoma court began with the
premise enunciated in the case of Sherbert v. Verne2 6 that the
right to freedom of religion grants an individual the "right to the
free exercise of the practices of his chosen religion..." without
government intervention or interference, unless a contravening
compelling state interest in regulation is shown.' This ruling by
the court is a rejection of the position taken by the state.2
Proceeding from this premise, the court cited State v.
Whittingham2" and People v. Woody, which relate to the use of
peyote by the Native American Church. In those cases, the court
noted, the state interest in the regulation of peyote was weighed
against the right of members of the Native American Church to
practice peyotism. In both instances, the scales were tipped in
favor of the Native American Church. In Whittingham, the
Arizona court dealt at length with the history and development of
the Native American Church in North America.' In Woody, the
California court also observed that the Native American Church
has a long and distinguished history. 2 It noted that the Native
American Church was not "a fad or a part of the popular drug
culture. 3 3 The Oklahoma court also noted that the Native
American Church had been incorporated in the state of Oklahoma
since March 18, 1920, under the early name of "Church of the First
Born.'
State courts have also looked to federal regulations for
guidance. The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs has
responded by issuing a limited regulation pertaining to "religious
ceremonies of the Native American Church."35 This regulation
states that the "non-drug" use of peyote is not subject to federal
control. The same type of an exception for religious use of peyote
in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American Church
also appears in regulations issued by the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare. 6 The constitutionality of these regulations
has been tested in federal court with no majority view emerging.3
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The Commissioner of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs of the state
of Oklahoma has also passed rules and regulations granting an ex-
emption of this nature to Native American Church members." The
state legislature, in promulgating the Uniform Controlled
Dangerous Substances Act, 9 vested the Commissioner of Nar-
cotics and Dangerous Drugs with this rule-making authority.
After noting the aforementioned state and federal regulations
exempting Native American Church members from peyote posses-
sion laws, the court ruled that the state failed to present evidence
that would sustain a finding of a state interest in regulation com-
pelling enough to prevail over the religious rights of Native
American Church members."0 The court held:
It is, therefore, our opinion that in a prosecution for posses-
sion of peyote under the provisions of the Uniform Controll-
ed Dangerous Substances Act it is a defense to show that the
peyote was being used in connection with a bona fide prac-
tice of the Native American Church and that it was used or
possessed in a manner not dangerous to the public health,
safety or morals.'
Even though this holding is not substantially different than
those set forth in Woody and Whittingham, the Oklahoma court
clarified this principle in relation to the facts of the instant case. It
is at this point the court begins to break new ground.
In applying this rule of law, the court divided the statement into
two distinct areas of inquiry. First, the court asked, "Who is a
member of the Native American Church? Or, more accurately,
how is that determination made?" 2 Second, the court asked,
"[W]hat constitutes a 'connection with a bona fide practice'?""
The requirement of Church membership to sustain a defense is a
more difficult question to approach than the latter requirement. It
is an issue of fact in the nature of an affirmative defense which
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury by credible
evidence. In allocating this burden to the trier of fact, the court
limited the jury's inquiry to the determination of, "whether the
claimant is a member of the Native American Church or merely
claims membership as a cloak for illegal possession or use of
peyote."" Quoting Woody, the court stated:
"We do not doubt the capacity of judge and jury to
distinguish between those who would feign faith in an
esoteric religion and those who would honestly follow it.
'Suffice it to say that trial courts will have to determine in
each instance, with whatever evidence is at hand, whether or
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not the assertion of a belief which is protected by the First
Amendment is in fact a spurious claim.' (In rejenison supra,
125 N.W.2d 588, 590) Thus the court makes factual examina-
tion of the bona fides of the belief and does not intrude into
the religious issue at all; it does not determine the nature of
the belief but the nature of defendant's adherence to it." See,
also In re Grady, Cal., 394 P.2d 728 (1964).
Complete church rosters, although the best form of evidence to
prove this element, are not an available nor reasonable source of
proof. As the court noted, no church under United States jurisdic-
tion has ever been required to enroll all its members in order to en-
joy religious freedom. ' - Furthermore, only the Caddo Chapter of
the Native American Church in Oklahoma has a complete list of
its members."6 In the absence of rosters, the courts must look to
other forms of evidence. Oral evidence is the obvious alternative.
At trial,uncontroverted oral testimony established that Whitehorn
was a member of the Otoe and Ponca chapters of the Native
American Church." Whitehorn testified that he was a member and
had attended approximately thirty meetings since he was eight or
nine years of age. He based his assertion of membership on the
fact that "he was an Indian and had chosen the Church .... "48
Other witnesses corroborated Whitehorn's testimony as to his
membership, while no witness for either side could affirmatively
state that Whitehorn was not a member. 9 Considering the
testimony adduced at trial relating to membership, the court said:
"[W]e feel there was much positive evidence demonstrating defen-
dant's membership in the Native American Church that is not in-
credible and which is uncontradicted."5
Other means of proof have been explored in other jurisdictions.
Golden Eagle v. Johnson5' is a Ninth Circuit case based on facts
almost identical to Whitehorn. The appellant, Golden Eagle,
sought damages, injunctive relief, and a declaration that certain
California laws were unconstitutional. He argued that under the
first and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitu-
tion, an arrest for the possession of peyote should be, at the very
least, preceded by an adversary hearing to determine if the
accused was in possession of the peyote for a bona fide religious
purpose. 2 He further urged two additional alternatives that were
required by the amendments; first, an exparte showing that there
was probable cause to believe the peyote was not being used for a
bona fide religious purpose; second, the arresting officers should
make a good faith effort to check the good faith of the religious
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claims of the person in possession before he is arrested.3 The ap-
pellant based these assertions on the fact that the required alter-
natives should be designed to minimize interference by the state of
bona fide religious use of peyote.'
In an adept display of judicial hocus-pocus, the court in Golden
Eagle refused to rule on the validity of the first amendment
freedom of religion as applied to the use of peyote, while at the
same time denying appellant's arguments relating to prearrest pro-
cedures. In refusing to pass on the first amendment question the
Court noted, "[Olur not-ions of judicial restraint outweigh this
consideration." ' The court's statement reflects a narrow-minded
philosophy that smacks of colonial puritanism. The Oklahoma
court is obviously not shackled by such antiquated dogma.
A further example of statutory treatment is seen in the state of
Texas, which has exempted Native American Church members
from culpability under their drug prohibition statutes.? This ex-
emption for use in bona fide religious ceremonies by members of
not less than 25 per cent Indian blood is supplemented by the re-
quirement that those persons who supply peyote to the Church
must register and keep appropriate records in accordance wth
rules promulgated by the "director." The term "director" is
defined by statute as the "Director of the Texas Department of
Public Safety or an employee of the Department designated by
him.""7 Pursuant to this authority, the Director promulgated "Re-
quirements for Registration as Peyote Distributor."'" These regula-
tions set up a bureaucratic obstacle course of registration, record-
keeping, and disclosure which appears to be all but prohibitive in
application. One wonders what percentage of "distributors" in
Texas have adhered to these rules. This is significant because the
Rio Grande Valley is the major source of peyote for the North
American tribes.?
Ironically, peyotism has also been prohibited in at least one
reservation area. The Navajo tribal ordinance prohibiting peyote
use has been upheld on two separate occasions.' In one case, the
court ruled it lacked jurisdiction to hear an attack on a tribal or-
dinance, even though it might affect religious freedom, while in a
later case the cause of action was dismissed primarily because of
mootness.
In addressing the second area of inquiry, namely, "what con-
stitutes a 'connection with a bona fide practice'?,"'l the Oklahoma
court observed, "At first blush this question appears also to be for
the trier of fact, but it is not. It is a matter of law for the courts to
decide. ' 6 2 Therefore, if the use in question is deemed to be "con-
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nected with a bona fide practice" by the trial judge, he must so in-
struct the jury. This, coupled with a finding of membership by the
jury, satisfies the affirmative defense. The act sought by the defen-
dant to be protected by the first amendment is the simple posses-
sion of peyote. The defendant stated at trial that he was carrying
peyote, at the time of his arrest, because he had put the buttons in
his pocket while cleaning his room earlier, but failed to replace
them before he left the house. ' The practice of carrying peyote by
Native American Church members was described at trial by one
witness as "something that is very holy and religious to our
people."" This testimony was corroborated by other evidence ad-
duced at trial and on appeal." Relying on these facts, the court
held "there has been no state interest shown compelling enough to
prevent the Native American Church members from possessing
their sacred, sometimes 'inherited,' peyote and from transporting
the same on their person within the State of Oklahoma." By us-
ing this language, the court recognizes that this practice is con-
nected with a bona fide religious use, thereby protecting it from
government interference. There apparently has been no such rul-
ing in any other jurisdiction.
Conclusion
The value of the Whitehorn decision will be judged only by
time. The practical application in the everyday lives of Oklahoma
Indians will be the determinative factor. If law enforcement of-
ficials and prosecutors refuse to adhere to the principles set forth
in Whitehorn and harass good faith members of the Native
American Church for possession of peyote, then the holding will
be worth little more than the paper it was printed on. However, if
law enforcement officers heed the significance of Whitehorn, the
religious practices of good faith Native American Church
members will no longer be stymied by well meaning officers. In
practice, when a Native American Church member is found by
law officers to be in possession of peyote, if it is obvious that the
peyote is for religious observance only, the officers should not
report the possession. If they do, the district attorney then should
weigh the circumstances and determine if charges should be filed.
The accused should provide any type of proof deemed ap-
propriate.
While allowing for prosecutions of "those who would use
peyote for non-religious purposes committing sacrilege against the
Church and in violation of the drug laws of the State,' the
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Oklahoma court has tried to minimize the chilling effect of
government interference with religious practices, while allowing
prosecution of those who use peyote for nonreligious purposes.
The desirability of having membership rosters or any other form
of proof of membership is left entirely in the hands of the Board of
Trustees of the Native American Church, as is the membership re-
quirements of who may or may not become a participant in the
Native American Church. In balancing the competing interests of
the state and the Native American Church, the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Oklahoma attempted to clarify the rights of each party
and arrived at a well-educated and sensitive solution to a most
perplexing problem.
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